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n Vienna, on 16 and 17 April 2003, the
UN Commission on Narcotic Drugs
(CND) will devote a ministerial segment
to “evaluate progress made and difficulties
encountered” in drug control efforts over the
past five years. This is the mid-term review
of the goals and targets set at the 1998 Unit-
ed Nations General Assembly Special Session
(UNGASS) on drugs, where the world com-
mitted itself to “eliminating or significantly reduc-
ing the illicit cultivation of the coca bush, the
cannabis plant and the opium poppy by the year
2008” and to “achieving significant and measur-
able results in the field of demand reduction”. In
this special briefing prepared for Vienna, TNI
looks back at the process leading up to
UNGASS adopting these unrealistic pledges,
highlighting the obstinate avoidance of the
fundamental questions necessary for an eval-
uation of the efficacy of the current approach
to drugs control. The briefing also looks for-
ward to Vienna and beyond, offering recom-
mendations for a constructive agenda. 
The medical profession takes as its principle
Hippocrates’ dictum: ”Primum non nocere -
First, do no harm”. In the same vein, the open-
ing phrase of the 1961 Single Convention, a
major step towards the universalisation of a
drug control regime, was “Concerned with the
health and welfare of mankind...”. And it is out
of this very same concern that many have
started to question the paradigm framing
current drug control efforts. The indiscrim-
inate repression unleashed in name of the
global prohibition regime, and foremost by
the ‘zero tolerance’ and ‘War on Drugs’
interpretations thereof, has lost sight of the
primum non nocere-principle. Extremes like the
massive incarceration of drug law offenders,
chemical spraying of drug-linked crops, use of
military force against farmers, death penalties
for traffickers, denial of basic protective ser-
vices necessary for preventing the spread of
deadly diseases, are all clear examples of the
contradictions - not only with this principle
but with fundamental human rights. The Hip-
pocratic oath has found a hypocritical appli-
cation in the field of drug control.
There has been a consistent pattern: from the
position that “investigations should not be allowed
to influence international control measures in any
way whatsoever” and threats that if research
“failed to reinforce proven drug-control approach-
es, funds for the relevant programs should be cur-
tailed” to the censorship of publications that
“failed to show the great advances in the fight on
drugs”. A fearful attitude to an open-minded
and evidence-based drugs debate has char-
acterised policy deliberations at the UN level.
The justification has been: “The UN from its
high position must be clear.  Any doubt, hesitation,
or unjustified review of the validity of goals will only
undermine our commitment. Our goals are noble
and inflexible. We cannot be successful if there are
discordant voices. We cannot retreat, we must be
steadfast in our goals”.
TNI has been engaged for many years in a
critical policy dialogue with drug policy offi-
cials around the world. This has proved very
constructive for clarifying the complexity of
the issues and the policy dilemmas at stake.
It has helped shape our conviction that a
more pragmatic approach is required and,
moreover, that this view has considerable
backing, not least among policy officials, hith-
erto curtailed in expressing their views with
the freedom we can here. There is an urgent
need to create a better climate of debate, to
allow officials and experts in the field to air
their doubts and table their proposals with-
out fear of being branded traitors to the
‘noble and inflexible goals’ of the UN con-
ventions.
This briefing is offered in the sincere hope
that the April review will lead to a more
open-minded debate, genuine re-assessment
of the applied principles, a greater realism as
regards reducing drug-related harms and new
space for experimentation and policy diver-
sity.
n New York on 8-10 June 1998, the UN
20th General Assembly Special Session
(UNGASS) met to discuss the world
drug problem. Kofi Annan hoped that
“when we look back upon this meeting, we will
remember it as a time ... when we pledged to work
together towards a family of nations free of drugs
in the twenty-first century.” The president of the
Special Session, Mr. Udovenko (Ukraine),
highlighted the sense of a “growing convergence
of views” and a “spirit of togetherness”. He
hoped that the session would “go down in his-
tory as a truly watershed event”. Despite these
grand words, it was a disappointing event in
the end. No evaluation of current repressive
drug policies took place whatsoever, despite
the obvious failure evidenced by the contin-
uous rise in consumption and production of
illegal drugs during the 1990s. As a New York
Times editorial put it, the UNGASS was
devoted to “recycling unrealistic pledges”. The
world is now about to look back upon this
event, at the mid-term review of the
UNGASS in Vienna on 16 and 17 April 2003.
This briefing lays out the history leading up
to the 1998 UNGASS and its goals and tar-
gets for 2008. It is also the history of how
attempts to achieve some kind of reform
within the UN drug system have been mired
in a bureaucratic morass.
The Mexican call
The UN Decade Against Drug Abuse 1991-2000
became a very busy period for drug policy
officials and lawmakers around the world. The
first big event was a High-Level three day
meeting of the General Assembly in 1993.
There was hope that the ‘Fall of the Wall’ and
the end of the ideological divide would ease
the search for common ground and improve
international collaboration. The harmony,
however, was to be disturbed by the still
unresolved North-South divide, and by Euro-
pean experiments with Harm Reduction,
both questioning the existing drug control
framework. 
A Mexican letter to the Secretary General set
the tone for the 1993 meeting. Mexico saw
the event as an unprecedented opportunity
for international reflection, which had
become imperative as consumption was
increasing and criminal organisations were
thriving and expanding. It wanted more atten-
tion focused on the demand side because
“drug consumption is the driving force that gen-
erates drug production and trafficking, the reduc-
tion in demand becomes the radical – albeit long-
term – solution of the problem.” Mexico believed
that the “most effective means of reducing drug
production and trafficking is the gradual reduction
in current and future drug consumption.” The let-
ter contained strong criticism of US counter-
narcotics operations on Mexican territory
and the US unilateral drug certification mech-
anism. It pointed out that a united front
would prosper only if firmly founded on good
faith, legal principles, a recognition of the
unique identity of each country, and unre-
stricted respect for its sovereign rights. It
attacked “attempts to impose hegemony”, “poli-
cies of mutual recrimination” and “assigning blame
on the basis of Manichean geographical formulas,
which solve nothing”.1
Mexico further raised the need to review the
current classification of drugs “in order to
reduce the illicit drug market”, thereby implying
that they considered that for some sub-
stances controls could be lifted. The letter
went on to outline which areas required
urgent attention in order for the notion of a
“balanced approach” to be taken seriously,
most of which would re-appear on the
UNGASS agenda five years down the line:
demand reduction, money laundering, chem-
ical precursors, synthetic drugs and funding
for alternative development.
The Mexican letter expressed the tensions
between the US and Latin America and the
classical demand-supply divide in the global
drug control system, a result of the unbal-
anced political power relations under which
the three conventions were negotiated. The
whole control system built around the con-
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1 Mexico and international co-operation against the production of, demand for and traffic in drugs, Letter from the Permanent
Representative of Mexico to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General, 20 October 1993. A/C.3/48/2.
ventions was directed at suppressing illicit
supply, while demand-side policies were basi-
cally seen as a domestic issue. When the
question was posed as to whether a specif-
ic, fourth convention on demand reduction
was required, the International Narcotics
Control Board (INCB) recommended not.
The INCB was unconvinced that universally
binding treaty provisions on demand reduc-
tion could be agreed upon, or that such a
treaty would be an appropriate means of
dealing with the issue. It added that “demand
reduction programs should be developed at the
national and local levels, based on knowledge of
the real drug abuse situation, and taking into con-
sideration the cultural, political, economic and
legal environment.”2 A similar argument would
be just as valid for the supply side and it
would have been very wise to have taken into
consideration the cultural, political, economic
and legal environment
in national policies for
illicit cultivation.
It was the inherent
imbalance in the glob-
al drug control system
that Mexico, voicing
the frustrations of several Latin American
producing countries, wanted corrected.
Added to this, was the widespread realisation
that, aside from being out-of-balance, the
drug control efforts had proven disturbingly
ineffective thus far, giving rise to doubts about
the prohibitionist fundament of the system.
Secretary General Boutros Boutros-Ghali
urged Member States to bear two aspects in
mind: “On the one hand, the speed with which
the scourge spreads, with all of its consequences
for society and criminality; and on the other hand,
the fact that civil society is showing increasing impa-
tience, leading to simplistic or defeatist solutions.
More than ever, resolute action is needed at the
level of the very planet itself.” 3
Making the system bite
A divide between re-assessing international
drug control policies and re-affirming them
became increasingly apparent during the
three days. Several delegates stressed the
need to ‘restate commitment’, ‘reinforce’
and ‘strengthen’ the current system. In the
words of the UK delegate: “We have the
machinery; we need now to make it work better.
In particular, we need a more solid international
front in support of the 1988 United Nations Con-
vention. This is an instrument with teeth, and we
need to make it bite.”
Other delegates, however, used terms like
‘review’, ‘overall evaluation’, ‘try new strate-
gies’, and ‘redefine our actions’. Several
defended a non-repressive approach to con-
sumption, such as Mr. Torben Lund, Minister
of Health in Denmark, who
said: “I believe that we have
reached the point where we
must realize that there is a
need for new approaches to
the drug problem. ... There
may be a need to shift the
focus of our efforts from law
enforcement to prevention and treatment.” The
need for an open-minded debate was
stressed by Mr. Baltasar Garzón Real, repre-
senting the Spanish National Drug Plan. “The
time has come to pause and meditate on the solu-
tions that should be adopted,” Garzón said, urg-
ing a general debate to evaluate what has
been achieved and to think about the future.
“We should come to this debate without any pre-
conceived ideas or immovable dogmas. We must
be open to the exchange of ideas.” A process of
reflection within and by the United Nations
would be appropriate, according to Garzón,
because “the United Nations is the most appro-
priate forum and the optimum sounding board for
an exchange of ideas and for the adoption of deci-
sions on new lines of action that would help us
achieve our objectives.”
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2 Effectiveness of the international drug control treaties, Supplement to the Report of the International Narcotics Con-
trol Board for 1994, United Nations, New York 1995. E/INCB/1994/1/Supp.1: 6.
3 United Nations General Assembly, 48th Session, Official Records, Agenda Item 112, International Drug Control,
26-28 October 1993. A/48/PV.37-42.
“We have the machinery
(...) and we need to make
it bite”
At the conclusion of the 1993 debate, reso-
lution 48/12, drafted by Mexico, was adopt-
ed under which the General Assembly
requested the CND to evaluate drug control
instruments, so as to identify areas of “satis-
factory progress and weakness” and to recom-
mend “appropriate adjustments of drug control
activities whenever required”. It was also to con-
sider convening an ad hoc expert group to
contribute to the examination of the issues
and identify “concrete action-oriented recom-
mendations”.4 Several initiatives followed, but
their course clearly established the political
limits of the search for ‘appropriate adjust-
ments’. Discussions were
opened about the need to
review the classification of
coca and cannabis prod-
ucts under the Conven-
tions. Proposals were
tabled to examine the
costs and benefits of Harm
Reduction and decriminal-
isation strategies. And
Mexico started to rally support for a global
summit of reflection, which eventually led to
the 1998 UNGASS.
The Advisory Group
The UNDCP convened an inter-governmen-
tal ad hoc advisory group to recommend
‘appropriate adjustments’. The group was
advised by Mr Hamid Ghodse, president of
the INCB, who declared:  “It does not appear
necessary to substantially amend the internation-
al drug control treaties at this stage, but some tech-
nical adjustments are needed in order to update
some of their provisions” and some “shortcom-
ings should be eliminated”.5
The ten participants were carefully chosen.
Miguel Ruiz-Cabañas, then at the Mexican
embassy in Washington, who later went on
to head Anti-Narcotic Matters at the Mexi-
can Foreign Ministry, represented Mexico.
The other countries were the USA, India,
Argentina, the Russian Federation, Sweden,
Poland, Japan, Egypt and Nigeria, the latter
represented by Philip O. Emafo, then work-
ing as a consultant for UNDCP, who went on
to become president of the INCB in 2002.
No-one was invited from a country known
for a more liberal approach. The group met
twice at Vienna in the second half of 1994. It
supported the INCB,
which it said provided
substantial arguments
“to counter the strong
movement aimed at
showing that the inter-
national drug control
regime, based on the
application of the inter-
national drug control
treaties, had failed and that legalization was the
only solution”. 6 One participant demanded
efforts to defuse the ‘harm-reduction’ issue,
which was considered highly divisive. “Harm
Reduction was perceived as the Trojan Horse of those
factions championing the cause of legalization.”7
According to the UNDCP Executive Direc-
tor, however,“a more detailed study of the impli-
cations of decriminalisation and of harm-reduction
campaigns, as suggested by the advisory group,
might well produce new perspectives leading to
unexpected solutions”.8 In his report to the
CND, which wove suggestions from the
INCB and the advisory group, the Executive
Director recommended a two-pronged
approach. First, UNDCP should provide “con-
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4 General Assembly Resolution, Measures to strengthen international cooperation against the illicit production, sale,
demand, traffic and distribution of narcotics and psychotropic substances and related activities, 28 October 1993.
A/RES/48/12: art. 9 & 11.
5 Report of the International Narcotics Control Board for 1994, New York, 1995. E/INCB/1994/1, par. 21,b,c.
6 Report of the meeting of the ad hoc intergovernmental advisory group held pursuant to Commission on Narcotic Drugs resolu-
tion 3 (XXXVII), 18 November 1994. UNDCP/1994/AG.7: par.5.
7 Ibid., par. 60.
8 Follow-up to the results of high-level plenary meetings at the 48th session of the General Assembly to examine the status of
international cooperation against the illicit production, sale, demand, traffic and distribution of narcotic drugs and psychotropic
substances; Implementation of General Assembly resolution 48/12, Report of the Executive Director, 1 February
1995. E/CN.7/1995/14: par.45.
“Harm Reduction was
perceived as the Trojan
Horse of those factions
championing the cause of
legalization”
crete and sound arguments against legalization of
the non-medical use of drugs” and second,
UNDCP should “undertake a study on the impli-
cations of decriminalisation and of harm-reduction
campaigns”.9
The advisory group supported the idea of
convening an international conference. “Such
a meeting would provide an opportunity, inter
alia, to evaluate Government achievement to date
in the field of drug abuse control, and the possi-
bility of adopting a declaration of principles on
demand reduction. It was felt that the meeting
would be an appropriate forum for both Govern-
ments and UNDCP to reaffirm principles and
positions on legalization, decriminalisation, harm
reduction and other relevant issues”.10 Mr Gia-
comelli, the UNDCP Executive Director,
took up this recommendation in his report
to the CND, adding that the event should not
only ‘reaffirm’ but also ‘examine’ such posi-
tions.11
The group also recalled a statement made at
the opening of the 1994 CND session by Mr
Giacomelli that it was “increasingly difficult to
justify the continued distinction among substances
solely according to their legal status and social
acceptability. Insofar as nicotine-addiction, alco-
holism, and the abuse of solvents and inhalants
may represent greater threats to health than the
abuse of some substances presently under inter-
national control, pragmatism would lead to the con-
clusion that pursuing disparate strategies to min-
imize their impact is ultimately artificial, irrational
and uneconomical”.12
As regards the shortcomings and inconsis-
tencies in the conventions, the Executive
Director recommended that the CND
should convene a “group of experts to review the
adequacy of existing definitions in the 1961 and
1971 conventions, with particular reference to var-
ious cannabis and coca leaf products”.13
CND Member States were then invited to
comment on these recommendations.14 Peru
stated that there “was a need to re-examine tra-
ditional ways of addressing drug control issues,” and
that an international conference therefore
“should be forward-looking and promote innova-
tive solutions instead of being overly influenced by
traditional ways of addressing the problem.” Peru
and South Africa endorsed the proposal to
convene an expert group on coca and
cannabis, and a similar forum to evaluate
alternative development programmes. South
Africa and Australia supported the idea to
undertake a study on the implications of
decriminalisation and harm reduction poli-
cies, with the provision by Australia that if
such programmes were to be assessed “other
models of drug abuse programmes should also be
evaluated and that any assessment of drug abuse
programmes, including harm reduction pro-
grammes, should be balanced and open-minded.”
As far as the second part of the two-pronged
plan was concerned, with its call for “sound
arguments against legalization”, Australia felt
that such research “would need to be impartial
and address both sides of the legalization argument
to allow for a balanced and open debate”.
End station CND 1996
At its session in April 1996, the CND had to
decide what to do about the recommenda-
tions of the advisory group. One by one, the
proposals that could have opened the debate
and paved the way to regime changes were
blocked. “While there was some support for con-
vening an expert group meeting to review the ade-
quacy of existing definitions in the 1961 and
1971 conventions, with particular reference to var-
ious cannabis and coca leaf products, ... the opin-
ion was expressed that no expert group meetings
should be convened on issues that were within the
competence of the International Narcotics Control
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9 Ibid., par. 52. 
10 UNDCP/1994/AG.7: par. 79.
11 E/CN.7/1995/14: par.35.
12 Statement by Executive Director of the United National International Drug Control Programme at the Thirty-seventh Session of
the Commission on Narcotic Drugs, Vienna 13 April 1994.
13 E/CN.7/1995/14: par.46c.
14 Follow-up to General Assembly resolution 48/12, Report of the Executive Director, January 1996. E/CN.7/1996/3.
Board”.15 This was only one of the ‘opinions
expressed’, but it meant there was no con-
sensus and therefore that there would be no
review for cannabis and coca. 
The suggestion to study decriminalisation
and harm reduction was blocked in another
way. “Any move towards the legalization of the
non-medical use of drugs was strongly opposed.
Such a move would not only contravene the pro-
visions of the international drug control treaties, but
would also represent a serious setback for inter-
national cooperation in drug control. Whereas
there was some support for UNDCP research on
the issue of legalization of the non-medical use of
drugs, it was stated that such research might send
wrong signals to proponents of legalization”.16
This was only ‘stated’, but it meant there was
no consensus and therefore that such a study
could not be undertaken. 
Finally, the proposal to convene an interna-
tional conference where amendments to con-
ventions could have been adopted was
blocked on the grounds that it would be
‘cost-intensive’ at a time when “the UN was
experiencing the worst financial crisis since its foun-
dation.  However, the Commission concluded that
many of the objectives of a conference could also
be achieved by convening a special session of the
General Assembly”.17 The CND thus adopted
a resolution18 recommending what became
the 1998 UNGASS. Its objective was set as
being to “lead to renewed commitment by Gov-
ernments to the fight against drug abuse and illic-
it trafficking, and also strengthen the implemen-
tation of the international drug control instru-
ment”.19 Words like ‘evaluate’, ‘examine’, ‘sci-
entific review’, ‘identify weakness’, ‘appro-
priate adjustments’ or ‘develop new strate-
gies’ did not survive this CND session nor
make it into the final resolution.
Renewed commitment 
Before this proposal could be considered by
the General Assembly, it had to pass through
the Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC)
under whose authority the CND operates.
ECOSOC devoted a three-day high-level seg-
ment in 1996 to the outcome of the CND
meeting.20 Mr Schroeder, then president of
the INCB made his point clear in the open-
ing session: “Governments should keep in mind
that experiments in the field of harm reduction cur-
rently taking place in several developed countries
could be misused by those advocating the legal-
ization of drugs. ... In the view of the Board, legit-
imisation of the non-medical use of drugs of abuse
under the rubric of ‘harm minimization’ could not
be justified.”
Australia was not intimidated. Its delegate
replied that harm minimisation measures
were the key to his country’s strategy. They
were being introduced, without necessarily
awaiting the elimination of drug misuse.
While a harm minimisation strategy might not
be appropriate for all countries, it had pro-
duced significant successes in reducing the
social, economic and health-related harms in
Australia. The UNGASS scheduled for 1998
would provide “an excellent opportunity to deter-
mine whether any improvements were needed in
established structures, with a view to making them
even more effective in the work of the international
community to combat narcotic drugs.” Portugal
declared that governments must be open to
public debate in the search for adequate
solutions, particularly when there were
doubts about the effectiveness of some mea-
sures. Switzerland’s observer said: “The inter-
national community should not allow itself to be
discouraged by setbacks, but should take the
opportunity to critically evaluate future strategies;
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15 Commission on Narcotic Drugs, Report on the 39th Session (16-25 April), Economic and Social Council, Official
Records 1996. E/1996/27: Supp.7, par.16.
16 Ibid., par. 27.
17 Ibid., par. 18. 
18 Resolution. Special session of the General Assembly devoted to the combat against the illicit production, sale, demand, traffic
and distribution of narcotic drugs and psychotropic substances and related activities. E/CN.7/1996/L.16.
19 E/1996/27: Supp.7, par.17
20 ECOSOC, Substantive Session of 1996, Provisional Summary Records of Meeting, New York, 25-27 June 1996.
E/1996/SR.10-15.
it should do so in a spirit of open-mindedness, ready
to learn from the experiences of others and pre-
pared to experiment where necessary.”
These views were exceptions. Overall, the
meeting confirmed the dominant paradigm.
ECOSOC approved the CND report, includ-
ing the recommendation to convene a Spe-
cial Session of the General Assembly in 1998.
The UN Secretary General subsequently sub-
mitted a report to the
General Assembly on the
possible outcome of such
a special session, fully
purged of re-assessing lan-
guage. “The special session
could reiterate the impor-
tance of the international drug
control treaties ... and could
reaffirm their relevance and
adequacy”. It would also
help “to achieve universal
adherence and implementa-
tion by the end of the millennium.” The session
“could result in a reaffirmation by Governments of
the political importance of drug control and in
renewed commitment”.21 Preparations for the
1998 UNGASS could begin, a responsibility
handed back to the CND in a series of
preparatory sessions in Vienna.
By the end of 1996, the most controversial
views and recommendations of the previous
few years, which could have turned the
UNGASS into a moment of genuine reflec-
tion, had been effectively neutralised. The
‘zero tolerance’ lobby must have been dis-
pleased to see some of them resurge in the
official UN World Drug Report published in
1997. A full chapter was devoted to the ‘Reg-
ulation-Legalisation Debate’22 written in the
spirit – as mentioned on the back cover – of going
‘beyond the rhetoric normally surrounding
the issue’: “In recent years there has been increas-
ing criticism that the resources poured into the ‘war
on drugs’ have been badly spent; and that the inter-
national drug control regime, instead of contribut-
ing to the health and welfare of nations, may have
aggravated the situation… Amidst perceptions of
an impasse in the drug policy field, numerous pres-
sure groups have emerged, calling for changes to
international drug control through the relaxation of
prohibition – for example, through modifications
to the existing drug control Conventions – and
through a new emphasis on measures to reduce
the harm associated with illicit drug use. Because
these groups are eclectic
in back-ground and
include academics, politi-
cians, medical scientists,
economists and influential
opinion leaders, for the
most part motivated by
serious and well-founded
concerns, they represent
a serious challenge to the
current philosophy of
drug control.” 
1998 UNGASS: the compromise
Having played a key role in the call for the
Special Session, Mexico aspired to its presi-
dency. This was blocked by the USA, con-
cerned about Mexico’s critical tone. It took
hours of hard bargaining behind the scenes
before a compromise was reached offering
Portugal the presidency. Mexico still played
a strong role in the preparations for
UNGASS, chairing the inter-governmental
group that elaborated the draft for the ‘Guid-
ing Principles of Demand Reduction’, one of
the key documents on the UNGASS agenda.
Mexico also submitted draft texts on money
laundering and precursor issues. Mexico’s
aim, according to its Ambassador to the UN
in Vienna, was to help adjust the international
drug control regime such that demand reduc-
tion could play a greater role in “bringing into
balance the strategy that previously over empha-
sized one side of the problem” .23
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21 General Assembly 51st session. Preparations for and possible outcome of a special session of the General Assembly on inter-
national drug control. Report of the Secretary-General, 9 October 1996. A/51/469.
22 World Drug Report, UNDCP/Oxford University Press, 1997, pp.184-201.
23 R. Lajous Vargas, ‘La ONU y el Narcotráfico’, Nexos, 246, June 1998.
http://www.nexos.com.mx/internos/foros/drogas/drogas_8.asp
“The international drug
control regime, instead of
contributing to the
health and welfare of
nations, may have
aggravated the
situation…”
It was also hoped that UNGASS would mark
the end of the ‘era of fingerpointing’. Both
Mexico and Colombia stressed that the old
dichotomy between traditional producer and
consumer countries should give way to the
principle of ‘shared responsibility’, acknowl-
edging not only the imbalances of the past but
also the fact that the traditional dividing lines
had become more blurred over time. After
several difficult negotiations, especially on
the demand reduction and precursor issues,
the UNGASS outcomes
eventually reflected this
spirit. Many documents
approved did emphasise
the responsibility of the
‘North’ to, among other
things, reduce demand, reg-
ulate the trade in chemical
precursors, control the
production of ampheta-
mines type stimulants
(ATS), and address the
money laundering issue. 
The main threat to achiev-
ing this new balance arose from a proposal
put forward by Pino Arlacchi, appointed as
the new Executive Director of the UNDCP
in September 1997, in the midst of the
preparatory process. His SCOPE-plan, the
‘Strategy for Coca and Opium Poppy Elimi-
nation by 2008’, called for wiping out illicit
crops in Colombia, Bolivia, Peru, Burma,
Laos, Vietnam, Afghanistan and Pakistan, the
eight countries where coca and opium pro-
duction is concentrated.24 SCOPE brought
back the rhetoric of a ‘drug-free world’
through total elimination of drug-linked crops
and would have shifted the burden of respon-
sibility back to the opium and coca produc-
ing countries. 
The plan was never endorsed, but provided
the impetus for the adoption in the UNGASS
Political Declaration of its most controver-
sial article 19 which calls for, “eliminating or sig-
nificantly reducing the illicit cultivation of the coca
bush, the cannabis plant and the opium poppy by
the year 2008”.25 Only after fierce debate, was
it agreed that the same year would also to be
the target date for “eliminating or significantly
reducing the illicit manufacture, marketing and traf-
ficking of psychotropic substances, including syn-
thetic drugs, and the diversion of precursors”, as
well as for “achieving significant and measurable
results in the field of demand reduction”. These
are the pledges that are on the agenda of the
April 2003 mid-term
review “to evaluate
progress achieved and
difficulties encountered”
halfway to the 2008
deadline.
During the Special
Session, only a few
delegates continued
to express doubts
about the carefully
negotiated and fragile
consensus. Raymond
Kendall, Secretary
General of Interpol, stressed the need for a
new policy that “should not naively confuse real-
ity with any type of demagogic faith, but be based
on objective information and multidisciplinary
research.” Similarly, The Netherlands empha-
sised the need for evidence-based strate-
gies: “The next step should be to evaluate the
results of our past efforts in order to find out what
works and what does not. In discussing new strate-
gies, let us not get trapped in the ideological dis-
putes of the past. Let us instead base our discus-
sions on facts and on the practical experiences we
have gained over the years”.26
In the years since the UNGASS, however, lit-
tle space was to be found in that direction.
UNDCP Executive Director Pino Arlacchi
heavily censored the second World Drug
Report 2000. The section that was meant to
follow up the 1997 chapter on the regulation
debate was scrapped altogether, as was a full
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24 T. Blickman, Caught in the Crossfire: Developing Countries, the UNDCP, and the War on Drugs, TNI/CIIR, London, June
1998. http://www.tni.org/drugs/reports/caught.htm
25 Political Declaration, General Assembly 20th Special Session, 9th Plenary Meeting, June 10, 1998. A/RES/S-20/2.
26 General Assembly 20th Special Session, Official Records, 8-10June 1998. A/S-20/PV.1-9.
“In discussing new
strategies, let us not get
trapped in the
ideological disputes of
the past. Let us instead
base our discussions on
facts and on the practical
experiences we have
gained over the years”
section on cannabis and several others. The
co-ordinator, Francisco Thoumi, left the
agency in protest. “Arlacchi was very concerned
because the original draft did not reflect his vision
of the world drug situation. In particular, he argued
that it was too pessimistic and that it failed to show
the great advances in the fight on drugs that had
taken place recently. He frequently argued that the
world drug problem was on the verge of being
solved and that there were only three countries that
were real problems: Colombia, Afghanistan and
Myanmar”.27 Quite a few other UNDCP staff
were forced to leave or resigned over dif-
ferences with Arlacchi. There was a purge –
some say a witch-hunt – to cleanse the UN
drug control system of suspected ‘defeatist’
elements that might further disrupt the ‘spir-
it of togetherness’.
Conclusions
The consensus-driven functioning of the UN
drug control machinery has led to strange
outcomes. “There is something very special about
illicit drugs. If they don’t always
make the drug user behave
irrationally, they certainly cause
many non-users to behave that
way.”28 In private, most
authorities agree that it is
unrealistic to expect to
eradicate drugs and that
the present regime is inef-
fective. As soon as they sit
down in the conference
halls in Vienna and New
York, however, they shift
into consensus-mode and
the majority of officials are swept along in a
ritual of rhetoric, while the minority prefers
to keep as low a profile as possible. Thus,
after a decade of high-level meetings during
which it is widely acknowledged that “the
problem advanced faster than the remedy”, any
initiative to “seek out the reasons for the impo-
tence of the present system of control” is neu-
tralised and every recommendation for
‘appropriate adjustments’ is thrown to the
wind. After all this, the international com-
munity concluded in 1998 they could still
accomplish in 10 years what they had been
unable to achieve in the 25 years they had
agreed to in the 1961 Convention. 
The INCB had already announced in its 1994
paper: “The international community has
expressed a desire not to reopen all debates but
to build on those commonly defined strategies and
broad principles and to seek ways to further
strengthen measures for drug control”.29 The
many calls, coming from the very same ‘inter-
national community’, to “critically evaluate
strategies in a spirit of open-mindedness, ready to
learn from experiences and prepared to experi-
ment where necessary” have been countered
with Manichean cold war-like accusations of
treason to ‘our noble cause’. 
Looking back at the history of the 1998
UNGASS reveals the limitations of the ratio-
nal functioning of the UN drug control
machinery. Behind
the apparent unanim-
ity of the UNGASS
outcomes, lies a long-
standing conflict with-
in the UN system
between nations des-
perately trying to
maintain the status
quo of a prohibition
regime rooted in
‘zero tolerance’, and
those recognising its
failure, illusion and
hollow rhetoric who are opting for a more
rational and pragmatic approach. Instead of
the proclaimed ‘growing convergence of
views’, it is evident there is a growing diver-
gence and an impasse which urgently needs
to be broken. 
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27 F. Thoumi. ‘Can the United Nations support “objective” and unhampered illicit drug policy research? A testimo-
ny of a UN funded researcher’, Crime, Law & Social Change 38, 2002, p. 161–183.
28 Marihuana, the Forbidden Medicine, Lester Grinspoon and James Bakalar, Yale University Press,1993.
29 E/INCB/1994/1/Supp.1: 8
“There is something very
special about illicit
drugs. If they don’t
always make the drug
user behave irrationally,
they certainly cause
many non-users to
behave that way”
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The World Health Organization (WHO) has a
particular role in the making of UN drug poli-
cy, relatively separate from the hardcore trian-
gle UNDCP-INCB-CND. Its role is restricted to
recommending, on the basis of health consid-
erations, under which schedule of the 1961 and
1971 conventions particular substances should
be categorised. This is a task for which the
WHO convenes an Expert Committee on Drug
Dependence every two years. The WHO only
can make recommendations, the CND decides.
From the beginning, the WHO has been at odds
with the established drug control system, never
finding a rationale to live with the existent illic-
it-licit distinction. Its mandate to look purely at
health impacts leads the WHO consequently to
refer to “psychoactive substances, including
alcohol and tobacco”. The latter two consti-
tute a far bigger headache to them than the
illicit drugs placed under the schedules of the
drug control conventions. Their own statistics
show, for example, that all illicit drugs taken
together are estimated to cause 0.6% of lost
“Disability-Adjusted Life Years”, compared with
6.1% caused by alcohol and tobacco.1
In 1990, at the beginning of the Decade Against
Drug Abuse, the WHO established its Pro-
gramme on Substance Abuse (PSA), appointing
six staff members to strengthen WHO’s contri-
bution to the field. The British Journal of Addic-
tion applauded the decision with an editorial
under the title “Six Horsemen ride out”. One of
the commentators in the journal welcomed
the PSA “because now attention can be direct-
ed to correcting the balance, formerly too heav-
ily weighted on the side of supply reduction and
drug laws enforcement, whose practitioners
have often reminded one, in the intensity of
their belief in the ‘wickedness’, not only of traf-
fickers but of the chemicals themselves, of those
honest brokers (dispensers) of justice who con-
demned so many innocent old women to death
as witches”.2 He referred to the historical
document Discoverie of Witchcraft, published
in 1584 to protest the rising tide of persecution
of innocents by a superstitious clergy, a book
condemned to be burned by King James I of
England. The author saw an important function
for the PSA in producing scientific facts to bring
common sense to the drugs issue, which “I
hope no-one would wish to burn”. Subsequent
events suggest that he was somewhat opti-
mistic.
The enthusiastic PSA team decided to expand
the mandate of the Expert Committee to cover
a broader range of issues related to demand
reduction. The 1992 Expert Committee there-
fore met with a dual mandate. Ten substances
had to be reviewed for scheduling, but the
experts were also asked “to look at the various
strategies and approaches for reducing sub-
stance use and its harmful consequences”. After
debating the practice of traditional coca chew-
ing in the Andes and Khat use in Africa, the
committee “recommended studies looking
towards possible changes in international con-
trol provisions concerning these traditional pat-
terns of use”. The Committee also concluded in
its report that the “primary goal of national
demand reduction programmes should be to
minimize the harm associated with the use of
alcohol, tobacco and other psychoactive drugs.
... for maximum effectiveness, national policies
should be oriented to explicitly defined ‘harm
minimization’ goals”.3 This conclusion was
reached “not without some grumbling”, espe-
cially from the side of two committee members,
Hamid Ghodse, then INCB president, and
Philip O. Emafo, nowadays president of the
Board. In the end though, they went along with
the report, which “adopted a relatively wide-
ranging view of harm reduction, so that, for
instance, regulation of the supply was seen as
among the potential harm reduction strate-
gies”.4
WHO: Cocaine Project
In 1992, the PSA launched the “WHO/UNICRI
Cocaine Project”, which according to a press
release in March 1995 was the largest global
study on cocaine use ever undertaken. “The
sometimes unexpected conclusions of the study
do not represent an official position of WHO”.5
Box 
WHO: ‘Six Horsemen ride out’
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A Briefing Kit summarising the results of the
study was circulated at the March 1995 CND
meeting. The conclusions strongly conflicted
with accepted paradigms, for example “that
occasional cocaine use does not typically lead to
severe or even minor physical or social problems
... a minority of people start using cocaine or
related products, use casually for a short or long
period, and suffer little or no negative conse-
quences, even after years
of use. ... Use of coca
leaves appears to have no
negative health effects
and has positive, thera-
peutic, sacred and social
functions for indigenous
Andean populations.”
The largest future issue,
according to the study,
was whether the world
“will continue to focus on
supply reduction approaches such as crop
destruction and substitution and law enforce-
ment efforts in the face of mounting criticism
and cynicism about the effectiveness of these
approaches. ... There needs to be more assessment
of the adverse effects of current policies and
strategies and development of innovative
approaches. … Current national and local
approaches which over-emphasize punitive drug
control measures may actually contribute to the
development of health-related problems.” 6
Almost as soon as the Briefing Kit started to cir-
culate in the UN corridors, USA officials used
their full weight to prevent the release of the
study. “The United States government has been
surprised to note that the package seemed to
make a case for the positive uses of cocaine,” was
the response of Neil Boyer, the USA’s represen-
tative to the 48th meeting of the World Health
Assembly in Geneva. He said that the WHO
programme on substance abuse was “headed in
the wrong direction” and “undermined the
efforts of the international community to stamp
out the illegal cultiva-
tion and production of
coca”. He denounced
“evidence of WHO’s
support for harm-
reduction programmes
and previous WHO
association with orga-
nizations that sup-
ported the legalization
of drugs.” Then came a
clear threat:  “If WHO
activities relating to drugs fail to reinforce
proven drug-control approaches, funds for the
relevant programs should be curtailed”.7 It had
its intended effect insofar as the results of the
Cocaine Project were never published. The
Briefing Kit had been a premature release of the
summary results, before the full research out-
comes had gone through the usual thorough
review and editing process. Because of the
commotion, however, no agreement on the list
of peer reviewers could ever be found, so the
process was never completed. Years of work
and hundreds of pages of valuable facts and
insights about coca and cocaine by more then
40 researchers were, in effect, “burned”.
Box 
WHO: ‘Six Horsemen ride out’
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“If WHO activities
relating to drugs fail to
reinforce proven drug-
control approaches,
funds for the relevant
programs should be
curtailed”
ow will the international com-
munity assess the progress
achieved and difficulties
encountered in meeting the
UNGASS goals and targets? A look at the
mechanisms put in place for monitoring that
progress reveals a disturbing lack of clear cri-
teria and a deliberate avoidance of inconve-
nient questions. There is bias towards a
process-oriented evaluation (how much has
been done to achieve the goals) while out-
come-oriented questions are seriously
neglected (what has been the impact of all
those actions on the actual drug situation).
What it should be all about, the central ques-
tion, is not addressed – namely: is the world
being effective in getting closer to the goals
and targets for 2008? The mid-term review
appears not to be aimed at genuine evalua-
tion with a view to learning lessons for
improving our effectiveness, but seems to be
aimed rather at maintaining the political com-
mitment required to fight the good fight.
Nations and UN agencies will pat each other
on the back for all efforts done, without ques-
tioning whether those efforts have had any
impact at all on the availability and use of illic-
it drugs. The main reason for this approach
is anticipation that the challenging answers to
what should be the central outcome-orient-
ed questions might well prove too inconve-
nient for the status quo.
“The special session represented a landmark in
international efforts to achieve a drug-free world”,
concluded the Commission on Narcotic
Drugs at its 42nd session in March 1999
where the UNGASS follow-up process was
discussed. “The Commission had been called
upon by the General Assembly to play a critical role
in the follow-up to the special session and to
ensure that the objectives were met by the agreed
target dates.” The challenge was to “establish
an effective follow-up process, so as to maintain
the political momentum and commitment gener-
ated by the twentieth special session.”1 Guidelines
were adopted for reporting on progress
achieved in meeting the goals and targets for
the years 2003 and 2008. Implementation of
the ambitious aims as laid down in the
UNGASS Political Declaration was linked to
three Action Plans, one on eradication and
alternative development, one on drug
demand reduction and one against ampheta-
mine-type stimulants (ATS), as well as a series
of proposed measures to control precur-
sors, counter money-laundering and pro-
mote judicial cooperation.
Instruments
A key instrument for the follow-up process
is the Biennial Reports Questionnaire (BRQ)
that countries are to use to report on
progress made in implementing the action
plans and measures. All one hundred and
forty one BRQ questions are process-ori-
ented. “Have measures been taken by your Gov-
ernment to...”? “Has your Government established
working procedures for...”? Or “Has your Govern-
ment enacted new, or revised existing, laws and reg-
ulations...”?2 On the basis of this set of stan-
dardised data, UNDCP elaborates a com-
prehensively summarised global overview of
the implementation process in the form of a
biennial report to the CND “to facilitate the
mid-term review and the preparation of a report
to the General Assembly in 2003.”3 The intro-
duction to the first biennial report explained
that the “analysis below accordingly reflects the
action taken by Member States, as reported in the
questionnaire, without going into a detailed assess-
ment of the effectiveness of such action.” In fact,
no such assessment of effectiveness is made
at all, neither in the Biennial Report nor in
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1 E/CN.7/1999/15/Rev.1. Commission on Narcotic Drugs, Report on the forty-second session (16-25 March 1999 and 30
November and 1 December 1999).
2 BRQ - Biennial Reports Questionnaire, Questionnaire for reporting on the action plans and measures adopted by
the General Assembly at its twentieth special session.
3 E/CN.7/2001/16. Consolidated first biennial report of the Executive Director on the implementation of the outcome of the
twentieth special session of the General Assembly, devoted to countering the world drug problem together, Report of the Exec-
utive Director, 4 October 2001.
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4 Global Illicit Crops Monitoring Programme (ICMP), UN-ODCCP, Vienna, January 2000.
5 Global Illicit Crops Monitoring Programme (ICMP), UN-ODCCP, Vienna, January 2000.
6 E/CN.7/1999/15/Rev.1. Commission on Narcotic Drugs, Report on the forty-second session (16-25 March 1999 and 30
November and 1 December 1999).
7 E/2000/60. Progress report on basic indicators for the integrated and coordinated implementation of and follow-up to major
United Nations conferences and summits at all levels, Report of the Secretary-General, Economic and Social Council, 26
May 2000.
8 E/CN.7/1999/15/Rev.1. Commission on Narcotic Drugs, Report on the forty-second session (16-25 March 1999 and 30
November and 1 December 1999).
the separate follow-up reports on the imple-
mentation of the Action Plans that the
UNDCP Executive Director provides to the
CND, nor least of all in the actual debates on
those reports at the annual CND session.
Anyone familiar with those meetings is
annoyed by the endless interventions by del-
egates listing their nation’s seizures, eradica-
tion efforts, new measures and programmes
and the total absence of a content or strate-
gic debate.
There is a parallel procedure with Annual
Reports Questionnaires (ARQ) on the basis of
which UNDCP’s Research Section drafts the
annual Global Illicit Drug Trends with detailed
statistics estimating production, trafficking
and consumption, supplemented by an ana-
lytical section on the evolution of the global
illicit drug problem, tackling a different theme
each year. This is a very valuable source of
information, meant as a tool for regular
assessment of the situation in light of
UNGASS goals and targets. Moreover,
acknowledging that “reliable and systematic
data to monitor and evaluate the progress towards
achieving these goals are presently not available
[..] UNDCP has developed two global programmes:
first, a global programme to monitor the cultiva-
tion, and yields, of illicit crops, and second, a glob-
al programme to assess the magnitude and pat-
tern of illicit drug abuse. Both Programmes, once
implemented, will be the core of a credible inter-
national follow-up to stated commitment of UN
Member States to reduce the production and con-
sumption of illicit drugs.”4
The prominence the 1998 UNGASS gave to
“eliminating or significantly reducing the illicit cul-
tivation of the coca bush, the cannabis plant and
the opium poppy by the year 2008”, resulted in
a priority to establish the Global Illicit Crops
Monitoring Programme (ICMP). Detailed surveys
are underway of cultivation and yields for
opium in Afghanistan, Myanmar and Laos, and
for coca in Colombia, Peru and Bolivia. “It is
presently estimated that well over 96 per cent of
illicit opium poppy and coca bush are cultivated in
these six countries and hence the six sub-pro-
grammes will virtually cover all of the global culti-
vation areas.”5 This has greatly improved, as
the CND requested, “the systematic effort [..]
in the collection of data and the setting of bench-
marks to facilitate the assessment of progress
towards that goal”.6
Methodology and indicators
In spite of all the difficulties in obtaining reli-
able and comparable data, and the many
resulting gaps in information, steps forward
have been made that would enable an attempt
to assess progress five years down the line -
not just in process terms but also as regards
impact. Within the UN system, experience
and knowledge exist about monitoring and
evaluation mechanisms, developed around
other thematic summits and conferences,
and special importance is given to the devel-
opment of basic indicators for the formula-
tion of effective policies and monitoring
progress towards the priority goals of major
UN conferences.7 Indeed, after the drugs
UNGASS “several representatives considered that
the Commission should establish a common
methodology, an agreed set of principles and indi-
cators to monitor progress. In that regard, refer-
ence was made to the experience of the Inter-
American Drug Abuse Control Commission
(CICAD) of the Organization of American States
(OAS) and of the European Monitoring Centre for
Drugs and Drug Addiction. They could serve as
models for other regions, and also provide valuable
lessons for the Commission.”8
In 2000, a draft resolution was tabled in the
CND stressing “the need to adopt indicators to
serve as a guide in the preparation of reports to
the General Assembly on the progress achieved in
meeting the goals and targets for the years 2003
and 2008, thus ensuring the impartiality and
objectivity of the newly created mechanism, with
a view to permitting joint examination by the inter-
national community of the progress achieved in
worldwide efforts to counter the drug problem and
drug-related crime”.9 The draft made an explic-
it distinction between “indicators for imple-
mentation-related goals” concerned with pro-
grammes, legislation and other measures,
and “indicators for results-oriented goals in order
to enable the Commission to assess the progress
achieved in meeting the targets for the year 2008”.
This underlined the need to determine both
types of indicators. The sponsors, however,
withdrew the resolution after being con-
vinced by other delegates that it was super-
fluous.
Indeed, the Commission could have learned
from both the CICAD and from the Euro-
pean Monitoring Centre (EMCDDA). In col-
laboration with Europol, the EMCDDA has
developed methods and tools for evaluation
of the European Union strategy on drugs. At
the request of the European Commission,
they make a clear distinction between dif-
ferent levels of evaluation. A first process-ori-
ented stage will monitor and assess the level
of implementation of the planned actions, and
subsequently an assessment will be made
oriented to the measurement of the possible
impact of these achievements on the drug sit-
uation.10
Measuring results
So far, the follow-up process has produced,
on the one hand, a wealth of data on the
world drug situation: global trends and crop
surveys and, on the other hand, extensive
documentation on all actions undertaken by
governments to implement the UNGASS
outcomes. No-one really tried to establish
whether the latter has had any impact on the
former, nor are there clearly established indi-
cators for ‘progress’ or a methodology to
measure the impact of policy interventions.
Regularly, a local success story in illicit crop
reduction is heralded, too often too easily
attributed to policy interventions and this is
then extrapolated for regional or global
impact, often contradicted by UNDCP’s own
figures. 
In 1999, for example, the Commission noted
that: “Significant progress had been made in
meeting the target of the special session of elimi-
nating or significantly reducing the illicit cultivation
of the coca bush, the cannabis plant and the opium
poppy by the year 2008. The most striking devel-
opment in 1999 was the continuing, steady decline
in the extent of cultivation of the coca bush in the
Andean region, although concern was expressed
regarding the displacement of coca cultivation
from one zone to another. [..] Significant inroads
had been made in eliminating illicit cultivation of
the opium poppy in Asia.”11
Again in 2000, “Landmark progress had been
made in implementing the Action Plan on Inter-
national Cooperation on the Eradication of Illicit
Drug Crops and on Alternative Development, with
illicit cultivation of narcotic crops being eradicated
in several countries.” That was the conclusion
of the debate under the UNGASS follow-up
agenda item. When discussing at the same
session the report on the world drug situa-
tion, indeed it was noted that “illicit cultivation
of the coca bush in Bolivia and Peru substantially
declined in recent years.” However, “the esti-
mated supply of cocaine to illicit markets remained
relatively stable”.12 CICAD, in its most recent
evaluation of drug control 2001-2002, even
notes a sharp increase in cocaine production,
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9 E/CN.7/2000/L.10. Indicators for determining progress achieved in meeting the goals and targets for the years 2003 and
2008, Argentina and Mexico: draft resolution, 6 March 2000, (Withdrawn).
10 Report by the European Monitoring Centre for Drugs and Drug Addiction and Europol on the identification of criteria
for an evaluation of the European Union Strategy on Drugs (2000-2004) by the Commission. Europol File NR 2564-144.
11 E/CN.7/2000/11. Commission on Narcotic Drugs, Report on the forty-third session (6-15 March 2000).
12 E/CN.7/2001/12. Commission on Narcotic Drugs Report on the forty-fourth session (20-29 March 2001).
due to higher yields: “Coca cultivation decreased
by approximately 9% compared to 2000, and
remains at nearly 200,000 hectares, which is the
usual level for the last ten years. [..] Although the
number of hectares under cultivation have
remained constant over the last 10 years, poten-
tial production increased by 23% during the same
period, reaching a potential production level of
1,027 metric tons in 2001.”13 The year before
CICAD reported: “The overall conclusion is
that notwithstanding efforts to reduce crops in pro-
ducing countries and cocaine seizures, production
and availability of this drug for consumption have
not been reduced.”14
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13 OAS/CICAD – Statistical Summary on Drugs 2002. Inter-American Drug Abuse Control Commission (CICAD),
Uniform Statistical System on Control of the Supply Area (CICDAT).
14 OAS/CICAD – Statistical Summary on Drugs 2001, CICAD/CICDAT.
15 The Opium Economy in Afghanistan - An International Problem, UN Office on Drugs and Crime (ODC), 2003.
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As for global opium and heroin production,
the UNDCP estimates indicate a more fluc-
tuating but still relatively stable trend for the
past decade, with 1994 and 1999 showing
peaks and 2001 showing an abrupt decline
due to that year’s bottom harvest in
Afghanistan caused by the Taliban opium ban,
drought and rock bottom prices due to over-
production the previous year. Afghan pro-
duction in 2002 resumed and worldwide pro-
duction was slightly up compared to the
average over the past decade.15
Impact assessment
“Several Governments had introduced pre-export
notifications for potassium permanganate and
acetic anhydride, the essential chemicals for the
illicit manufacture of cocaine and heroin. In so
doing, they had attained one of the most ambitious
Source: CICAD
Source: UNDCP
objectives set by the special session with regard to
precursor control.”16 Implementation of
UNGASS measures in this field and interdic-
tion operations against precursor chemicals
are regularly applauded as clear examples of
successful drug law enforcement efforts.
“Operation Purple is one of the most successful
operations undertaken so far within the framework
of international precursor control. During the first
phase of operations (April-December 1999),
almost 8,000 tons of potassium permanganate
were tracked, and 32 shipments totalling 2,200
tons were stopped at the source or seized by the
importing country. Operation Purple has resulted
in the prevention of large amounts of that sub-
stance from being diverted to the illicit manufac-
ture of cocaine.”17 In October 2000, Operation
Topaz was launched to track in a similar way
acetic anhydride. 
True, those are clearly measurable achieve-
ments. Still, it does not say anything at all
about the actual impact regarding the key
objective of these efforts: to reduce the avail-
ability of cocaine and heroin on the interna-
tional markets. CICAD also points at
progress regarding precursor control mea-
sures, but at the same time questions the
impact it has had, reporting that since “the
First Evaluation Round 1999-2000, the countries
have made progress by developing legislation and
the capacity to determine their needs, in order to
prevent the diversion of pharmaceuticals and con-
trolled chemical substances. [..] Nonetheless,
increasing diversion of chemical precursors paral-
lels the upward trend observed in illicit drug pro-
duction.” Consistent with their finding that the
“information available, [..] reveals an upward trend
in drug use in the hemisphere among diverse
social groups, particularly youth.”18 And the
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CND in 2002 noted for price trends, con-
sidered to be one of the key indicators of
drug availability and the impact target of pre-
cursor control, that  “heroin prices had contin-
ued to decrease in North America and Western
Europe [..] in both of those subregions, cocaine
prices had continued to be stable or decreasing.”
Also, “Strong concern was expressed about the
growth in manufacture, trafficking and use of
ATS.”19
Conclusion
Especially on supply reduction side, there is
an astonishing lack of sound argumentation
about the consequences and impact of poli-
cy interventions on the illicit market. The
general assumption seems to be that inter-
diction operations contribute to achieving the
aim of supply reduction simply because they
are designed to do so.
Market responses and
counter-measures by
criminal groups involved
are not taken into account
when judging the overall
impact. Very basic ques-
tions are rarely posed. For
example, if price develop-
ments are a useful indica-
tor of drug availability,
there are no data on the basis of which one
could argue that the many seizures of ship-
ments have ever reduced the availability on
the consumption markets. They seem, rather,
to have contributed to increased production
to balance the losses. Tightening precursor
control is more likely to increase their black
market prices, increase criminal R&D invest-
ments in replacement chemicals and exacer-
bate corruption in the chemical industry,
rather than to reduce the availability of the
illicit drugs, which is ostensibly their main aim.
Already the smuggling of precursors has
become an illegal business as profitable as
smuggling drugs themselves. 
Looking at the available estimates for key indi-
cators like global production and price trends,
positive conclusions as to the effectiveness of
the current drug control regime cannot be
drawn. “Attempts to combat illegal drugs by
means of law enforcement have proved so mani-
festly unsuccessful that it is difficult to argue for
the status quo,” said the chairperson of the
House of Commons Home Affairs Select
Committee in the United Kingdom, Chris
Mullin, when he released the Committee’s
report The Government’s Drugs Policy: Is It Work-
ing? in May 2002. The report concluded: “If
there is any single lesson from the experience of
the last 30 years, it is that policies based wholly
or mainly on enforcement are destined to fail. It
remains an unhappy fact that the best efforts of
police and Customs have had little, if any, impact
on the availability of illegal drugs and this is reflect-
ed in the prices on the street which are as low as
they have ever been. The best that can be said,
and the evidence for this
is shaky, is that we have
succeeded in containing
the problem.”20
At the UN level,
attempts to hide this
behind a huge smoke-
screen of successes, as
regards quantities of
control measures
undertaken and descriptions of local or tem-
porary fluctuations in the illicit market, are
not convincing. A mid-term review restrict-
ed to a process-oriented evaluation of imple-
mented measures leads to a distorted picture
of virtual progress. If evaluation is meant for
learning lessons and improving policy effec-
tiveness, it cannot escape an assessment of
the impact on the drug situation. Genuine
evaluation can lead to inconvenient conclu-
sions and therefore presupposes a political
willingness to question the validity of exist-
ing policies. Herein lies the problem.
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dom, May 2002.
“Attempts to combat illegal
drugs by means of law
enforcement have proved
so manifestly unsuccessful
that it is difficult to argue
for the status quo,”
alfway to the 2008 target date
set by UNGASS, it should be
recognised that a more realistic
view regarding those targets is
needed. There are no indica-
tions that production trends are showing a sus-
tainable pattern of decline, nor can substantial
results be argued for demand reduction. The
world will not be drug-free in 2008, nor will
there be major achievements regarding “elim-
inating or significantly reducing the illicit cultivation
of the coca bush, the cannabis plant and the opium
poppy.” Home Secretary David Blunkett already
concluded that the more modest UK targets
for 2008 - to achieve halving the availability and
use by young people of heroin and cocaine and
cutting by 50 per cent levels of drug-related
crime - were “not credible”. Those targets had
been established in 1998 by picking figures “out
of the air,” according to Blunkett.1 A similar
recognition would have to be made about the
UNGASS targets if the assembled ministers in
Vienna don’t want to make fools of themselves.
In this case, the 2008 date was not, in fact,
picked out of the air but out of a Clinton
speech. Then UNDCP Executive Director Pino
Arlacchi basically wanted to be friendly with
the president of the nation leading the War on
Drugs globally. A nice gesture, nothing more.
While Arlacchi himself actually believed the
world could be freed from all illegal drugs with-
in a decade, most countries went along know-
ing this was simply another example of usual
UN practice to boost morale and political
commitment by setting high-reaching goals.
Progress has been most unsatisfactory, not
because not enough of the measures have
been implemented but because the strategy is
flawed. A ‘drug-free world’ is an illusion. Con-
sequently, the adopted strategies, goals and
targets have to be genuinely evaluated and
reviewed with an open mind towards future
policy directions. Below, please find a series of
recommendations for the mid-term review
and for the period 2003-2007, aimed at break-
ing the impasse in four areas we consider cru-
cial: the introduction of harm/risk reduction in
the UN drugs debate, the opening up of room
for manoeuvre on supply side, the undertak-
ing of efforts to improve the climate of the
UN-level drugs debate, and a revision of the
drug control conventions.
Harm/risk reduction in the UN
drugs debate
The moment has arrived for a breakthrough
for the harm reduction or risk reduction con-
cept. It should become a normal and accept-
ed part of the debate on the UN level. In the
Action Plan adopted in 1999 to implement the
UNGASS Guiding Principles on Demand
Reduction, countries committed themselves to
offer “the full spectrum of services, including reduc-
ing the adverse health and social consequences of
drug abuse”.2 The Declaration of Commitment
on HIV/AIDS adopted at the UNGASS June
2001, specifically calls on nations to ensure, by
2005, expanded access to clean needles and to
promote “harm reduction efforts related to drug
use”.3 There is now broad acceptance that on
demand side there is much more to strive for
and gain than only looking at prevalence fig-
ures. The European Union Strategy on Drugs
(2000-2004), states as one of its targets to
“reduce substantially over five years the incidence
of drug-related health damage (HIV, hepatitis B and
C, TBC, etc.) and the number of drug-related
deaths.” An EU Council recommendation on
risk reduction is in process to specify actions
that should be undertaken to reach that goal.
In spite of considerable national differences,
the EMCDDA sees a trend across Europe in
the direction of more pragmatic policies. “In
many countries, prominent developments in the
legislative area include moves to target substances
regardless of their legal status, to widen the dis-
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tinction between drug users and drug-law offenders,
to reduce or remove penalties for personal use or
possession of cannabis and to strengthen the legal
framework for substitution treatment.”4 Outside of
Europe, several countries have been moving in
a similar direction, most notably Canada, Aus-
tralia and New Zealand, while some Latin
American countries are exploring taking such
steps. 
There is also a growing recognition of the need
to distinguish between recreational use and
problematic use and a shift in policy focus
accordingly, concentrating policy efforts on
the relatively small group of problematic users.
Only a minor percentage of recreational users
develop problematic patterns of abuse. Though
no use of illicit or licit psychoactive substances
is completely free of health risks, they are part
of youth cultures and fashions, linked to music,
nightlife and ‘having fun’. According to the
EMCDDA, policy responses for recreational
use must be “information-based and aim at under-
standing how best to manage the risks.” “Attempts
to control drug availability are not adequate respons-
es for reducing risk” nor are “messages that sim-
ply say ‘Don’t use drugs’”.5
These developments taken together should
lead to a change in climate at the level of
UNDCP, CND and INCB, the core triangle of
the UN drug control machinery that so far has
consistently rejected the use of these terms in
the policy debate. This is in contrast to agen-
cies like WHO, UNAIDS and UNDP that are
already using the harm/risk reduction concept
as a matter of course.6 Thus, the issue of UN
system-wide consistency is also at stake here.
Room for manoeuvre on 
supply side
On the consumption side, there is a clear ten-
dency towards more lenient, rational and prag-
matic drug policies. On the production side to
the contrary, there has been an escalation in
repressive approaches. The UN conventions
leave little ‘room for manoeuvre’ regarding the
cultivation of drug-linked crops, concentrated
in developing countries where thousands of
peasants depend on illicit crops simply to sur-
vive. The last decade was marked by an inten-
sification of chemical spraying of crops in
Colombia, an attempt to develop mycoherbi-
cides to start a biological front in the War on
Drugs, increased military involvement in drug
control efforts especially in Latin America
under US leadership, collaboration with the
Taliban regime to impose an opium ban in 2000
and now pressure on the Karzai government
to enforce the ban while nothing is yet in place
regarding alternative livelihoods. Supply reduc-
tion efforts in producing countries have cre-
ated great harms to individuals and to society
at large, intensifying internal conflicts, cor-
ruption, human rights violations, destruction
of livelihoods and environmental degradation.
A harm reduction policy at that level is urgent-
ly required.
The most vulnerable along the illicit drugs
chain - drug consumers on the one end and
small farmers and indigenous communities
involved in the cultivation of illicit crops on the
other - have suffered disproportionately the
negative consequences of drug control policies.
For consumers, at least, the global regime
allows a margin of latitude countries can
choose to use. This includes the decriminali-
sation of consumption, expediency and pro-
portionality in law enforcement, a variety of
treatment services, and harm reduction mea-
sures such as needle exchange. 
Since the 1988 Convention, there has been no
such room for manoeuvre for the production
side. The 1961 Convention’s “special provision
applicable to cultivation” (article 22) still left the
decision to criminalise or not in the hands of
each individual country: “Whenever the prevail-
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ing conditions in the country or a territory of a Party
render the prohibition of the cultivation of the opium
poppy, the coca bush or the cannabis plant the most
suitable measure, in its opinion, for protecting the
public health and welfare and preventing the diver-
sion of drugs into the illicit traffic, the Party concerned
shall prohibit cultivation.” Several conditions were
specified, however, under which a country
could permit the cultivation of opium poppy,
coca leaf and cannabis. A special government
agency had to be established to regulate pro-
duction on the basis of a licence system. Any
cultivation outside of such a regulated system
was not permitted and should be destroyed.
This 1961 latitude was tied to an agreement
to phase out opium consumption within 15
years and coca and cannabis within 25 years. 
These possibilities end with the adoption of
the 1988 Convention. Article 3, paragraph 1,
has an absolute mandatory character, since it
states that a signatory party shall “establish as
criminal offences under its domestic law [..] the cul-
tivation of opium poppy, coca bush or cannabis plant
for the purpose of the production of narcotic drugs
contrary to the provisions of the 1961 Convention”.
There are two, unclearly spelled out, exemp-
tions with respect to cultivation for personal
consumption (art. 3-2) and the requirement to
eradicate “shall take due account of traditional licit
uses, where there is historic evidence of such use”
(art. 14-2). Any other cultivation necessarily
has to be treated as a serious criminal offence.
An additional problem is posed by the fact that
the three crops (opium poppy, coca bush and
cannabis) are mentioned specifically in sever-
al articles of the 1961 and 1988 conventions.
A re-scheduling to a lighter control schedule
or taking them off the lists altogether would
therefore open more room for manoeuvre on
the consumption side, but not for cultivation.
One option for reforming the control regime
has been proposals for re-scheduling, especially
to take the coca leaf off Schedule I and cannabis
off Schedules I and IV of the 1961 convention.
Although this would open up space for more
policy diversity, amendments of the articles in
which they are mentioned would be necessary
to create any latitude as regards cultivation.
The absence of latitude for the production side
is a major obstacle to attempts at introducing
pragmatic policies for small illicit farmers. For
example, negotiations with coca farmer unions
in Bolivia and Peru on the separation of a licit
and illicit segment of the market, the propos-
al being debated in the Colombian Congress
to decriminalise small scale illicit cultivation, or
the wish of several countries to decriminalise
cannabis including its cultivation. It also hinders
attempts, in the context of Alternative Devel-
opment programmes, to find a legal rationale
for allowing more realistic gradual reduction
schemes, appropriate to the slow pace of
securing alternative livelihoods.
At the March 2002 CND session, a resolution
on Alternative Development was adopted ask-
ing for “a rigorous and comprehensive thematic
evaluation [..] for determining best practices in
alternative development by assessing the impact of
alternative development on both human develop-
ment indicators and drug control objectives and by
addressing the key development issues of poverty
reduction, gender, environmental sustainability and
conflict resolution”.7 This evaluation could pro-
vide a framework to discuss the pressing issue
of the absence of legal justification for prag-
matic approaches. Illicit cultivation is increas-
ingly regarded as a cross-cutting issue, to
which balanced responses have to be designed
that take into account policy considerations in
the areas of development, human rights, con-
flict resolution and prevention, etc. To enable
balanced decision-making, however, there has
to be room for manoeuvre.
Improve the climate of debate
The difference between the climate of debate
in the CND and that of drug policy debates and
practices outside of the Vienna conference hall
is staggering. Over the decades, difficulties in
developing a common discourse in interna-
tional drug control have led to the construction
of a glass bowl, a depressurised environment
that keeps certain ideas and terminology on the
outside to facilitate consensus-seeking.
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Fresh air is badly needed to improve the
debate. The CND Secretariat, UNDCP and
INCB have functioned mainly as air condi-
tioners, recirculating stale air within the sys-
tem. In preparing the agenda and documents
for a session, they filter out unwanted views
and concepts that threaten to put pressure on
the controlled climate of the system. They
recirculate only that air generated from the
already agreed principles and the signed con-
ventions. Rather than air conditioners, a ven-
tilation fan blowing in fresh air is sorely need-
ed. 
Ad hoc expert groups can play a role here. So
far, however, their composition has been con-
trolled and restricted to members of the tri-
angle CND-UNDCP-INCB. As a result, they
too served as air conditioners not ventilation
fans. UN-sponsored research projects can play
such a role too, but they have suffered from
politicisation and censorship. When things
threatened to get out of hand, as happened in
1995 with the WHO Cocaine Initiative, pres-
sure built up so quickly that the whole project
was simply deleted for fear that the glass bowl
might crack. UNDCP, in its function as a cen-
tre of expertise, could well play a fan role, but
under Arlacchi it tended to be characterised
by internal mole-hunts to discover and close
off ventilation shafts. The reform process
under the new Executive Director, Mr Anto-
nio Maria Costa, may well bring about signifi-
cant improvements on that level, however.
The new Operational Priorities for the Office on
Drugs and Crime (ODC) already stress the
need for “Independent evaluation to assess success
and failure in meeting objectives and in producing
impact.”8 Active NGO participation could play
a crucial ventilation role as well, though pro-
cedures are extremely limited and most groups
challenging the dominant discourse have found
the CND climate so appalling that they prefer
to stay clear of it.
The fearful attitude towards an open-minded,
rational and honest debate has to be over-
come. Inside the multilateral agencies, a huge
amount of knowledge and experience is under-
utilised. This could lift the debate to a more
evidence-based level, if given more space. A
process of cross-fertilisation between the
UNDCP Research Section, the UN World
Drug Report team, the WHO Expert Com-
mission, INCB, the CICAD Expert Group and
the EMCDDA has enormous potential. An
expert group composed of a cross-section
from those entities, with proper hearing or
consultation procedures for academics, NGOs,
users and farmers, could play a very valuable
role in evaluating the effectiveness of current
policies and producing debate-oriented papers
analysing ongoing policy trends and experi-
ments.
Revision of the Conventions
Greek Foreign Minister Giorgos Papandreou
proposes to undertake “a thorough evaluation of
the international drug treaties. We must verify their
effectiveness, shortcomings must be brought into the
open and proposals must be tabled to find new ways
for formulating and applying drug policies”.9 Open-
ing the debate about the conventions should
start, he said, from the recognition that a “dif-
ference in this field exists between theory and prac-
tice”. This relates to the cannabis decriminali-
sation policy trend, but also to risk reduction
practices such as user rooms, pill testing, hero-
in prescription, etc. According to current
INCB president Philip O. Emafo even needle
exchange should be regarded “contrary to the
provisions of the conventions”.10 He thus notices
a clear tension not only between practices and
conventions, but a fierce contradiction even
between stated UNAIDS objectives – agreed
to at the 2001 UNGASS on AIDS - and the
drug control conventions. 
“All EU member states have ratified the UN treaties
on the fight against drugs, but in everyday life coun-
tries deviate from the precepts contained therein.
Deviations that are dictated by the requirements of
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practical policy,” according to Papandreou. If
the international community could be proud
of its drug control achievements of the past
decades, a case could be made against the pur-
suit of alternative policies. Since that is not the
case, countries need to have leeway for exper-
imentation, from which the rest of the world
can draw lessons. The European trend is run-
ning into the limitations of what can still be jus-
tified within the confines of the treaties, while
no such leeway has existed at all for policy
pragmatism and experimentation regarding
illicit cultivation. 
Papandreou’s proposal clearly argues for
adjusting the conventions to the ‘requirements
of practical policy’, not the other way around.
Every year, the INCB also stresses the grow-
ing tension between theory and practice, but
tries to pressure countries to adjust their
practice to the letter and spirit of the con-
ventions they signed. Normally the liberal-
minded countries take a defensive position,
twisting in denial that any of their practices are
on a tense footing with the conventions. This
argument should be turned around, as Papan-
dreou proposes. Rather than trying to deny the
growing tension, it should be used as the main
argument for defending the need for a modi-
fication of the treaties. The fact that the INCB
again and again points out inconsistencies
(regardless of the soundness of their judicial
interpretation) should be sufficient reason to
ask for appropriate adjustments to the con-
ventions, if only to avoid further ambiguity. The
–restricted- mandate given to the Board means
that their judgements on some topics do carry
weight. The primary responses from govern-
ments under attack are frantic and legalistic
searches for loopholes, resulting in inconsis-
tencies in national law-making and enforce-
ment practices. 
After exploring options open to them under
their treaty obligations, the Ganja Commission
in Jamaica concluded that for their wish to
decriminalise cannabis, only “a workable if untidy
arrangement is possible, which would seek no sig-
nificant change in the status quo at present other
than relief to the thousands who annually are
brought before the court for personal use.”11Refer-
ring to the example of Dutch cannabis policy,
the commission pointed out the evident con-
tradiction of decriminalising personal use while
suppressing cultivation and trade, ‘a half-way
position’. National legal ambiguities are thus
spreading around the world. They are the
direct result of the straitjacket characteristics
of the conventions, combined with the per-
ception that the procedures to change provi-
sions of the treaties are too difficult. Unilat-
eral steps aimed at amendments are consid-
ered too unlikely to succeed. Denunciation is
considered too damaging for reputations inter-
nationally, or too costly given potential sanc-
tions from  the United States, which maintains
its own disciplinary framework of de-certifi-
cation or cuts in drug control-linked prefer-
ential trade agreements. The only way out is
to seek like-minded alliances, to find safety in
numbers. The Jamaican Commission recom-
mended that “as a matter of great urgency Jamaica
embark on diplomatic initiatives with its CARICOM
partners and other countries outside the Region, in
particular members of the European Union, with a
view (a) to elicit support for its internal position, and
(b) to influence the international community to re-
examine the status of cannabis.”
Three recent extensive parliamentary
enquiries in Canada, the UK and Jamaica, all
suggest a diplomatic initiative on the UN level.
The Canadian Senate Committee “recommends
that the Government of Canada inform the appro-
priate United Nations authorities that Canada is
requesting an amendment to the conventions and
treaties governing illegal drugs”.12 The House of
Commons Home Affairs Select Committee in
the United Kingdom concluded that “we believe
the time has come for the international treaties to
be reconsidered” and recommended that “the
Government initiates a discussion within the Com-
mission on Narcotic Drugs of alternative ways
–including the possibility of legalisation and regula-
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tion– to tackle the global drugs dilemma.”13 And
the Jamaican Ganja Commission concluded
that any steps further than the suggested
‘untidy arrangement’ “require diplomatic efforts
to join ranks with a growing number of Parties who
unilaterally are taking measures to ameliorate their
own anti-marijuana practices with respect to pos-
session and use, our aim being to get the interna-
tional community appropriately to amend the Con-
ventions.”14 These recent appeals add to numer-
ous calls made before,
such as a European Par-
liament resolution in
1995, adopted with an
overwhelming majority,
that pleaded to “encourage
discussion and analysis of the
results of the policies in force
as laid down by the relevant
1961, 1971 and 1988 UN
Conventions so as to permit
a possible revision of those
conventions”.15
A joint diplomatic effort in that direction could
take multiple forms. One might be a resolution
– in line with Papandreou’s proposal - request-
ing the CND to undertake a thorough evalu-
ation of the effectiveness of the existing drug
control framework. This could be undertaken,
for example, by an ad hoc committee as sug-
gested above based on a cross-section of
experts from the various existing multilateral
fora, with appropriate consultation procedures
for non-governmental organisations. Specific
review procedures could be opened up for
cannabis and coca. Another possible option to
explore would be ‘selective denunciation’, for
example for provisions regarding cannabis,
coca, possession for personal use and cultiva-
tion. The Law of Treaties allows for selective
denunciation on the basis of historical ‘error’
or ‘fundamental change of circumstances’
(‘rebus sic stantibus’). “Basically, the doctrine of
changed circumstances in the law of treaties says
that if the fundamental situation underlying treaty
provisions becomes so changed that continued per-
formance of the treaty will not fulfill the objective that
was originally intended, the performance of those
obligations may be excused.”16
Consensus on a new
approach to the drug
phenomenon will not be
found easily. Countries
currently not convinced
that a fundamental
change in course is need-
ed might, however, also
see the value of others
experimenting with inno-
vative strategies. This
would broaden the spec-
trum of practices from which to learn and
enrich the global policy debate. Any such ini-
tiative should aim therefore to enhance flexi-
bility and allow more policy diversity, instead
of seeking consensus on controversial issues.
Countries have sound reasons to question the
effectiveness of the current regime, to be
assertive about their achievements with prag-
matic approaches, and to demand adjustments
to the global legal framework that enable them
to continue on the path they’ve democratical-
ly chosen for. As the first UN World Drug
Report said: “Laws – and even the international Con-
ventions – are not written in stone; they can be
changed when the democratic will of nations so wish-
es it.”17
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13 The Government’s Drugs Policy: Is It Working?, House of Commons Home Affairs Select Committee, United Kingdom,
May 2002. 
14 A Report of the National Commission on Ganja to Rt. Hon. P.J. Patterson, Q.C., M.P. Prime Minister of Jamaica, August 7, 2001.
15 A4-0136/95, Resolution on the communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament on a European
Union action plan to combat drugs (1995-1999) (COM(94)0234 - C4-0107/94), European Parliament, 15 June 1995, Article 59.
16 The International Law of Treaties and United States legalization of marijuana, Leinwand, M., in: ‘Columbia Journal of
Transnational Law’, Vol. 10, 413-441, 1971.
17 World Drug Report, United Nations International Drug Control Programme, Oxford University Press 1997, ISBN 0-
19-829299-6, p. 199.
“Laws – and even the
international
Conventions – are not
written in stone; they can
be changed when the
democratic will of
nations so wishes it.”
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Throughout last year, the cannabis decrim-
inalisation trend continued, most notably in
Canada and the United Kingdom. This was
strongly criticised in the INCB Report 2001
and during the 45th CND session in March
2002.  
In May 2002, following the attack in the
CND on tolerant drug policies, the UK
House of Commons Home Affairs Select
Committee published the report, The Gov-
ernment’s Drugs Policy: Is it Working? It
declared, “We support the Home Secretary’s
proposal to reclassify cannabis from Class B
to Class C. (...) in future the maximum
penalties for the supply and possession of
cannabis, among other offences, would be
reduced from 14 years´ imprisonment to five
years (for supply) and from five years to two
years (for possession) (...). In addition, pos-
session of cannabis would cease to be an
‘arrestable offence’”. 
In July, the UK Home Secretary David Blun-
kett reaffirmed plans to reclassify cannabis
from Class B to Class C, the least harmful
category of illegal drugs in the UK. Accord-
ing to the new Criminal Justice Bill, howev-
er, any individual caught with Class C drugs
could be arrested. The Bill also proposes
that the maximum penalty for trafficking a
Class C drug should increase from five to
fourteen years’ imprisonment. It seems,
therefore, that everything will change but
remain the same - though the government
still promises ‘guidance’ against arrest for
possession for personal use. 
Then, in February 2003, the Home Office
published another research study, striking
out again at prohibitionism. Entitled Sub-
stance Use by Young Offenders: the Impact
of the Normalisation of Drug Use in the
Early Years of the 21st Century, the report
stated that “Many schools adopt a low- or
zero-tolerance to drug use. This may not be
helpful as it encourages children to conceal,
rather than deal with, their drug use and can
lead to the exclusion of those caught.”
The situation in Canada reveals fewer con-
tradictions, in spite of US pressure to reverse
its tolerance trend. In December 2002, Min-
ister of Justice Martin Cauchon announced
that Canada might soon do away with crim-
inal penalties for the possession of small
amounts of marijuana for personal use.
Days later, a special report of the House of
Commons recommended “a comprehensive
strategy for decriminalizing the possession
and cultivation of not more than thirty
grams of cannabis for personal use.”
After two years research, a report issued by
the Canadian Senate’s Special Committee
on Illegal Drugs went even further. It rec-
ommended “that the Government of Cana-
da amend the Controlled Drugs and Sub-
stances Act to create a criminal exemption
scheme. This legislation should stipulate the
conditions for obtaining licences as well as
for producing and selling cannabis.”
Addressing the press, Senator Pierre Claude
Nolin, Chair of the Special Committee,
declared “we have come to the conclusion
that, as a drug, it should be regulated by the
State much as we do for wine and beer, hence
our preference for legalization over decrim-
inalisation”.
Other countries are also exploring a more
lenient approach. In October 2002, Kaza-
khstan’s President Nursultan Nazarbaev
commissioned a study into the effects of
decriminalisation and legalisation of so-
called soft drugs, such as hashish and
cannabis. Switzerland’s parliament is cur-
rently studying a bill to decriminalise
cannabis use as well as the cultivation, man-
ufacture, purchase and possession of
cannabis for personal consumption. The
INCB Report 2002 notes that “if adopted in
its current draft form, that legislation would
actually go against the provisions of the
international drug control treaties.”
Box 
Cannabis under the Spotlight 
 www.tni.org/drugs/ungass
TNI website with information on the upcoming mid-term UNGASS review and back-
ground to the UN drug control system, the functioning of the involved agencies, trends
in international drug policy and the prospects for reforming of the UN Conventions
–the backbone of the global drug control regime.      
 www.vienna2003.org
Website of the International Coalition of NGOs for a Just and Effective Drug Policy
(ICN) on the UNGASS Midterm Review. It includes information on national and inter-
national events around UNGASS+5, alternatives to prohibition and an appeal to reform
international Drug Treaties. 
 www.senliscouncil.net
Website of the Senlis Council, a European forum composed of academics, experts
and NGOs brought together to assist policy-makers by providing fact finding papers
and new ideas on integrated drug policies. It includes the document: Illicit drugs con-
vention reform and the United Nations agencies, compiled by Andrew Wilson, September
2002.
 www.unodc.org
Website of the UN Office on Drugs and Crime. It includes all the official documents
from the CND sessions, the UNDCP publications, UN Treaties and resolutions, etc.
 www.oas.org/cicad
Inter-American Drug Abuse Control Commission of the Organisation of American
States. Available at this website the official documents on anti-drug strategies, action
plans to implement them, national plans, evaluations, access to national monitoring
centres on drugs, etc. It includes the document: Hemispheric Report - Evaluation of Progress
in Drug Control 2001-2002.
 www.emcdd.org
The European Monitoring Centre for Drugs and Drug Addiction offers in its website
a complete overview of European drug policies, researches and studies on drugs and
drug policies in Europe, criteria to evaluate the EU policies and the Commission’s mid-
term evaluation of the EU Action plan on drugs (2000-2004). 
 www.who.int/substance_abuse
The World Health Organisation deals with all psychoactive substances, regardless of
their legal status. In the section on substance dependence, research and reports on
both licit and illicit drugs are available.
 www.parl.gc.ca/illegal-drugs.asp
Website of the Special Senate Committee on Illegal Drugs with proceedings, testi-
monies, research papers, general information and its report: Cannabis: Our Position for
a Canadian Public Policy, September 2002.
 www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200102/cmselect
/cmhaff/318/31802.htm
The Government’s Drugs Policy: Is It Working?, House of Commons Home Affairs Select
Committee, United Kingdom, May 2002.
 www.rism.org/ncg.html
A Report of the National Commission on Ganja to Rt. Hon. P.J. Patterson, Q.C., M.P. Prime Min-
ister of Jamaica, August 7, 2001.
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REFERENCES AND USEFUL WEBSITES
By 1998, when the United Nations convened a
special General Assembly on drugs, there was
already overwhelming evidence that the current
approach to global drugs control had failed
miserably, given the continuing rise in consumption
and production. However, the evidence was
ignored and no evaluation of what was wrong with
current drug policy took place. Instead, as a New
York Times editorial noted, unrealistic pledges
were recycled, this time aiming at eliminating all
drug production by the year 2008. In mid-April this
year, the mid-term review of the goals and targets
set by the special session on drugs is to take place
in Vienna.
This briefing sets out the history to the original
call for a UN special session on drugs and explains
why no genuine evaluation has been permitted to
date. It also offers a constructive agenda for the
Vienna mid-term review in the hope that this can
contribute to a more rational, pragmatic and
humane approach to the global drugs
phenomenon. The views expressed here draw on
years of critical dialogue between TNI and drug
policy officials from around the world. As such,
they have considerable backing from officials and
experts in the field who, until now, have been
curtailed in airing their doubts about current
policy, presenting their evidence and tabling their
proposals for a way forward.
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Founded in 1974, TNI is an inter-
national network of activist-
scholars committed to critical
analyses of the global problems
of today and tomorrow. It aims
to provide intellectual support
to those movements concerned
to steer the world in a democ-
ratic, equitable and environ-
mentally sustainable direction.
Since 1996, the TNI Drugs &
Democracy programme has
been analysing trends in the ille-
gal drugs economy and in drug
policies globally, their causes and
their effects on economy, peace
and democracy. 
The Drugs & Democracy pro-
gramme conducts field investi-
gations, engages policy debates,
briefs journalists and officials,
coordinates international cam-
paigns and conferences, pro-
duces articles, publications and
briefing documents, and main-
tains a daily electronic news ser-
vice on drugs-related issues. 
The aim of the project and of
the Drugs and Conflict series is
to stimulate a re-assessment of
conventional prohibitive and
repressive policy approaches and
to argue for policies based on
principles consistent with a com-
mitment to harm reduction, fair
trade, development, democra-
cy, human rights, environmental
and health protection, and con-
flict prevention. 
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